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BATSON FOR THE BENCH? REGULATING THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF JUDGES
NANCY J. KING*
Unfortunately, the discretion of officials in the criminal justice
system can be exercised to discriminate on the basis of race. Aware-
ness of this risk has produced widespread efforts to eliminate or con-
tain that discretion. Restrictions on judicial discretion are perhaps
most familiar. They range from the adoption of sentencing guidelines
to the provision of remedies for discrimination in the selection of
grand juries. Confined, too, have been administrative decisions such
as those that determine the composition of jury pools or the release
and punishment of inmates.' Litigants are now barred from invoking
race in their arguments to juries2 and from exercising peremptory
challenges against jurors on the basis of race.3 Efforts to prevent dis-
crimination have reached even into the jury room, with some courts
instructing jurors that race is to play no role in their decision4 or step-
ping in to remedy verdicts that may have been the result of race-based
choices by jurors.5
Bucking this march toward the containment of flexible proce-
dures that leave room for racial discrimination are recent proposals to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. My thanks to Professors Steve
Burbank and Richard McAdams for their comments on a draft of this paper and to the many
judges and court administrators who generously provided sources and spoke to me about judicial
challenges in their jurisdictions.
1. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 188-92 (1997) (review-
ing the evolution of limits on the selection of grand jury forepersons); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 26.3(e), 26.2(c) (2d ed. forthcoming 1998) (discussing sentencing
guidelines, and procedural limitations on parole and good-time decisions); G. Thomas Mun-
sterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79 JUDICATURE 216 (1996) (reviewing jury
selection reform in the states).
2. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 256-77.
3. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(o) (1994) (instructions in federal death penalty cases must include
admonition against consideration of race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the
defendant or the victim).
5. See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94
MICH. L. REv. 2673, 2718 n.178 (1996) (discussing cases in which race-based juror misconduct
prompted judges to order new trials); see also Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917 (Del. 1996) (reversing
defendant's conviction based on juror misconduct in considering improperly the issue of race);
cf. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1995) (finding racial statements made by
members of an all-white jury about African-American plaintiffs sufficient "overt acts" to permit
trial court investigation).
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add the judicial peremptory challenge to federal code,6 following a
practice well-established in at least fourteen states.7 The judicial per-
emptory challenge grants a litigant one change of judge, without hav-
ing to specify a reason.8 At most, a litigant may be required to state in
boilerplate fashion that the litigant believes that a "fair and impartial
hearing" cannot be had before the judge9 and that the challenge is
made "in good faith." 10
6. See Peremptory Challenge Act of 1997, H.R. 520, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing to
amend the United States Code to allow parties to a federal civil or criminal case to challenge
judge without cause); Judicial Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing,
prior to amendment on the House floor on April 23, 1998, to grant parties to a federal civil case
one judicial reassignment without cause). The current proposals are not the first efforts to make
it easier for federal litigants to avoid judges they do not want. Prior bills containing peremptory
challenge provisions have failed to pass. See, e.g., Committee on Fed. Courts, New York City
Bar Ass'n, Committee Report: A Proposal for Peremptory Challenges of Federal Judges in Civil
and Criminal Cases, 36 RECORD 231 (1981) [hereinafter New York City Bar Ass'n Comm.];
Criminal Procedure Comm., Eastern Dist. of N.Y., Report on the Assignment of Cases to Judges,
Including Related Case Designations, and an Arraignment Function, 111 F.R.D. 303 (1986). For
examples of legislative proposals that have failed to pass, see Peremptory Challenge Act of 1983,
H.R. 3125, 98th Cong. (1983); Peremptory Challenge Act of 1981, H.R. 1649, 97th Cong. (1981).
See also Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification,
69 CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1445 n.1 (1981) (discussing federal proposals dating back to 1971 and
listing commentary on those proposals); Peter A. Galbraith, Comment, Disqualifying Federal
District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REv. 109 (1974) (evaluating 1971 proposals).
One well-known federal judge has provided the judicial peremptory challenge to federal
defendants in a narrow category of cases. See United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp. 611, 618
(1992) (Weinstein, J.) (holding that defendants in capital cases may challenge judge without
stating a reason).
7. For a reasonably up-to-date listing of peremptory challenge rules and statutes, see RICH-
ARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
765-839 (1996) (state-by-state review of judicial disqualification statutes). Most states that pres-
ently afford litigants the ability to exercise a peremptory challenge against a judge in a criminal
case have provided such a challenge since statehood. See LARRY C. BERKSON & SALLY DoRF-
MANN, JUDICIAL SUBSTrITION: AN EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN
THE STATES 17-18 (1986). A few have added the procedure since 1960. See id. at 19 (listing, as
of 1985, initial adoption dates of judicial peremptory challenge statutes in eighteen states); see
also ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 1996) (enacting peremptory disqualification of judge
statute in 1967); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-5 (West 1993) (enacting peremptory challenge stat-
ute in 1963 and extending it to allow prosecutors to request judge changes in 1987); Wis. STAT.
§ 971.20 (1996) (adopting criminal judge substitution statute in 1981); Sup. CT. R. 32.07 Mo.
REv. STAT. (1998) (repealing and reenacting provision authorizing the peremptory challenge of
judges in criminal cases in 1995).
8. Litigants typically must exercise the challenge within a certain time after the judge is
assigned. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022(c) (Michie 1996) (requiring litigant to file affidavit
requesting substitution within five days after case is assigned to a judge); Wis. STAT. § 971.20
(1996) (request for substitution of judge must be filed at least five days before the preliminary
examination); SuP. CT. R. 32.07(b) Mo. REv. STAT. (1998) (requiring that application be filed
not later than ten days after the initial plea is entered or, if later, not more than ten days after
the designation of the trial judge); see also H.R. 520 (proposing that application to reassign case
must be made no later than twenty days after the original notice of assignment).
9. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 14.250, 14.260(1) (1993).
10. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-12-26 (Michie 1996) ("[T]he party ... has good reason
to believe and does actually believe that such party cannot have a fair and impartial trial before
the named judge . . ." and "recite[s] that the affidavit is made in good faith and not for the
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There are many reasons to be concerned about the continuing
interest in judicial peremptory challenge, most of which have nothing
to do with racial fairness." My intent in this article is to examine in
particular the prediction offered by some critics of the judicial per-
emptory challenge that litigants will request a change of judge based
on the race of the judge.' 2 This concern is perhaps best exemplified
by two recent cases from California, a state that has guaranteed one
judicial challenge to each side in a criminal case since 1959.13 Califor-
nia's peremptory challenge requires a motion accompanied by an affi-
davit alleging prejudice on the part of the challenged judge.' 4 But any
old allegation of prejudice will do.15 The moving party need not show
any facts to support the allegations in the affidavit.' 6 Although Cali-
fornia amended its judicial disqualification statute in 1984 to include a
unique provision that states, "It shall not be grounds for disqualifica-
purpose of securing delay .... "); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21(4) (Supp. 1997) ("The demand
for change of judge must state that it is filed in good faith .... ); see also ALASKA R. CRIM. P.
25(d)(2) (1997) ("A party may exercise the right to a change of judge by filing a 'Notice .....
[which] shall neither specify grounds nor be accompanied by an affidavit."); State v. Greenlee
County Justice Court, 756 P.2d 939, 943-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that change of judge
does not require affidavit supporting a good faith basis for challenge).
11. See, e.g., New York City Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting Congress had not yet decided "that the costs of recusal on demand are worth bearing");
Stephen B. Burbank, Unwarranted Distrust of Federal Judges, 81 JUDICATURE 7, 41 (1997) (argu-
ing judicial substitution proposal will "increase cost and delay and send precisely the wrong
message about appropriate litigation behavior"); see also TERESA WHITE CARNs, ALASKA JUDI-
CIAL COUNCIL, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO JUDGES: SURVEY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 10-15
(1983) (listing efforts states had made in early 1980s to deal with administrative problems caused
by judicial peremptory challenges). Compare The Judicial Reform Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R.
1252 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 10571357 (statement of Henry A. Politz, Chief
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) (arguing that peremptory challenges
to judges threaten the independence of the judiciary) [hereinafter Hearings on Judicial Reform
Act], with id., available in 1997 WL 10571353, 1997 WL 10571354 (statements of Daniel E. Lun-
gren, Attorney General of California, and Arthur D. Helman, Professor, University of Pitts-
burgh School of Law) (asserting that a peremptory challenge statute will enhance the
accountability of judges and remedy occasional malfunctions of the judicial system).
12. See Hearings on Judicial Reform Act, supra note 11, available in 1997 WL 10571357
(statement of Politz) (stating that the current system for assigning judges ensures that the judge
is selected impartially, without regard to race).
13. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 1982) (noting that 1959 amendment brought
criminal cases under statute).
14. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1997).
15. See, e.g., Mayr v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 240, 240-41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(holding that prejudice is established by motion supported by affidavit that judge is so prejudiced
that party believes he or she cannot have a fair and impartial hearing); Simpson Team Alleges
Bias, Dumps Judge Set for Civil Suit, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 18, 1996, at A-4 (noting O.J.
Simpson's lawyer challenged judge's appointment with the declaration that the judge was
"prejudiced against defendant in this action").
16. See Solberg v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Cal. 1977) ("[Glood faith belief in
prejudice is alone sufficient, proof of facts showing actual prejudice not being required.") (quot-
ing McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d 268, 281-82 (Cal. 1974)).
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tion that the judge . . . [i]s or is not a member of a racial, ethnic,
religious, sexual or similar group and the proceeding involves the
rights of such a group,"117 this prohibition does not appear to apply to
California Civil Procedure Code Section 170.6, the peremptory chal-
lenge provision. 18
The trial of Damian Williams and two other African-American
men accused of being those captured on videotape beating a white
truck driver during the Los Angeles riots in the spring of 199219 pro-
vides the first example of what could be in store for a jurisdiction
adopting the judicial peremptory challenge. The case initially was as-
signed by the presiding judge to Judge Roosevelt Dorn, the only Afri-
can-American Superior Court judge trying criminal cases in the
district.20 The presiding judge was later quoted as saying that in addi-
tion to Judge Dorn's experience and qualifications, he "had the addi-
tional benefit, in my mind, of being a black man, one who I know to
be well-respected in the community. It was my belief that assigning
the case to him might offer some calming effect on the community."'2'
Following Judge Dorn's assignment, the prosecutor exercised his chal-
lenge to remove the judge.22 The action prompted a storm of criticism
that the challenge was racist.23 A white judge assigned to replace
Judge Dorn was then challenged by the defense. 24 The presiding
judge responded by appointing Judge John Reid, white and a former
prosecutor, an action that generated more protests by the defense and
the public.25
A spokesperson for the prosecutor's office defended the chal-
lenge of Judge 'Dorn by declaring that "prosecutors all along had
wanted a black judge .... [and had] thought that by exercising their
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §170.2 (West Supp. 1997).
18. See id. (mentioning only disqualifications of judges, not peremptory challenges).
19. See generally People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
20. See Judge in L.A. Beating Trial Denounces His Removal, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 1992, at
A12.
21. Jim Newton, Plea to Remove Judge in Denny Case Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992,
at Al (quoting Judge Cecil J. Mills) [hereinafter Plea Rejected]; see also Jim Newton, Judge
Attacks Reiner over Removal from Denny Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at Al [hereinafter
Judge Attacks].
22. See Judge Attacks, supra note 21.
23. See Jim Newton, Reiner Proposes New Black Judge for Denny Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
28, 1992, at Al.
24. See Jim Newton, Reiner's Remarks Disputed by Judge, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at B1
[hereinafter Reiner's Remarks Disputed].
25. See Jim Newton, Court Stays Assignment of Judge in Denny Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1992, at B3; All Things Considered: Denny Pre-Trail Accused of Racism (NPR radio broadcast,
Sept. 10, 1992); Leef Smith, Black Judge Ousted from Denny Case; L.A. Prosecutors Use Peremp-
tory Challenge, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1992, at A3 (describing protests outside courthouse).
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peremptory challenge to remove Dorn, the defense would disqualify
the next judge in line, who is white, and they would end up with Judge
Donald Pitts, who is black. '26 However, the presiding judge stated in
press reports that there was no basis for the prosecutor's expecta-
tion.27 He couldn't have assigned Judge Pitts, the only other African-
American judge in the court, because Judge Pitts was out on sick
leave. 28 Prosecutors claimed that they had challenged Judge Dorn be-
cause he was, in their opinion, too intemperate to handle such a con-
troversial trial.29 Judge Dorn, in the meantime, called a press
conference to object to his displacement. 30 He accused the prosecutor
of being "either misinformed ... or . . . an out-and-out-liar. ' 31 Step-
ping into the fray, the Court of Appeals granted the defendants an
additional peremptory challenge with which they removed Judge
Reid, who was then replaced by a third white judge.32 Six months
later, defense attorneys were still arguing (without success) that an
African-American judge should decide their challenge to the last in
the line of judges to be assigned the case. 33
While this controversy was brewing, the California Court of Ap-
peals handed down a decision in another case in which prosecutors
were accused of striking an African-American judge because of his
race. At his first trial Kenneth Williams, an African-American man
accused of the murder, rape, robbery, and kidnapping of a white wo-
man, moved to transfer his case to another county. 34 The trial judge
denied the request,35 but after the jury had convicted him, the Court
of Appeals held the judge's denial was error because of the "unaccept-
ably high" risk that "the jury would treat defendant-'a young black
man, a stranger to and friendless in the community'... as a dehuman-
26. Prosecutors Now Seeking Black Judge to Try Riot Case, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Aug 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File (attributing comments to spokesperson); see
also George de Lama, Prosecutor, Black Judge Trade Charges in L.A. Riot Beating Case, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 27, 1992, at 26 (same).
27. See Reiner's Remarks Disputed, supra note 24.
28. See Plea Rejected, supra note 21.
29. See Reiner's Remarks Disputed, supra note 24; Judge Attacks, supra note 21. And for
those of you who were wondering, yes, even Judge Ito made an appearance in this case, presid-
ing over an arraignment. See Jim Newton, 3 Plead Not Guilty in Denny Case; Black Trial Judge
Removed, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 26, 1992, at B3.
30. See Judge Attacks, supra note 21.
31. Reiner's Remarks Disputed, supra note 24.
32. See Edward J. Boyer, Challenge to Judge in Denny Case Assigned to Orange County;
State Judicial Council Makes Move After Prosecutors Reject a Defense Attempt to Have the Matter
Decided by a Black Jurist, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at B3.
33. See id.
34. See People v. Williams, 774 P.2d 146, 147 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
35. See id.
19981
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ized stranger. ' 36 The case was transferred to Sacramento County, but
the second trial was aborted when the trial judge there determined
that the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to exclude Af-
rican-American women.37 A third trial was derailed by "the inability
of [defense] counsel to continue. '38 Round four was assigned by the
presiding judge, Judge James T. Ford, to Judge James L. Long, who
was the only African-American judge sitting in the trial department of
that court.39 Using the peremptory disqualification provision, the
prosecutor challenged Judge Long.40 In an unusual response, Judge
Ford refused to reassign the case.41 Noting the prosecutor's abuse of
peremptory challenges against jurors in the second trial, Judge Ford
directed the prosecutor to disclose its reasons for disqualifying Judge
Long.42 The prosecutor responded that he had prosecuted two cases
prior to Judge Long's ascent to the bench in which Long had repre-
sented the defendant, that in his opinion Judge Long could not be fair
and impartial to the People, and that it might not be "feasible" to
obtain proper instruction and proper rulings on evidentiary matters.43
Judge Ford rejected these reasons, noted that no attorney, including
the local prosecutor's office, had ever challenged Long,44 found that
the defense had shown that the challenge was exercised on the basis of
race, and did not reassign the case.45 In a petition for extraordinary
relief prosecutors protested this ruling.46 After a lengthy opinion con-
sidering the issues, the California Court of Appeals concluded that the
prosecutor's challenge must be granted.47
These two episodes carry the unmistakable suggestion that given
the opportunity, some prosecutors and some defendants will shop for
judges on the basis of race or ethnicity. Admittedly, these California
36. Id. at 157 (citation omitted) (quoting Williams v. Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799, 805 (Cal.
1983)); see also id. at 153, 156-57 (noting that African Americans made up 0.4% of the county's
population, that 35 of the 250 potential jurors drawn for trial knew the victim, her family, or her
boyfriends, while not a single juror knew the defendant, and that the case involved sensational
racial and sexual overtones).
37. See People v. Superior Court (Williams), 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 886 n.3.
40. See id. at 875.
41. See id.
42. See id.; see also Bill Ainsworth, Refusal That Went Awry Renews Racial Bias Debate,
RECORDER, Oct. 30, 1991, at 1 (reporting that Ford's decision to reject challenge was "the first
denial of a request on account of racial bias").
43. See Williams, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887.
44. See Ainsworth, supra note 42.
45. See Williams, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 888.
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cases may be unique, telling us little about the functioning of courts
elsewhere. Even so, the sagas in these two cases conceivably could be
replicated anywhere that judicial peremptories coexist with a racially
diverse bench and racially sensitive cases. 48 The evaluation of this risk
is part of the larger debate about the wisdom of providing litigants in
criminal cases with the ability to challenge judges without cause.49
I. WHY WORRY ABOUT RACE-BASED ABUSE OF THE JUDICIAL
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE?
While the problem of race-based judicial challenges has certainly
not been as pervasive as the problem of race-based juror challenges, it
is nevertheless a real concern that should trouble those who champion
the peremptory challenge of judges. Past studies of the judicial per-
emptory challenge may reassure its supporters that the risk of race-
based abuse is low. The most comprehensive study of every state
utilizing such challenges reported in 1985 that ten percent of defense
attorneys surveyed (or six of sixty-three) believed that challenges
were exercised on the basis of race, and four percent of chief judges
(or five of 128) agreed.50 These responses are not insignificant, but
48. This risk has been noted by opponents of the federal proposals. See Hearings on Judi-
cial Reform Act, supra note 11, available in 1997 WL 10571357 (statement of Politz). Among the
arguments that ultimately defeated the unsuccessful federal proposals to institute peremptory
challenges in the 1980s was the charge that the challenges would be used for the wrong reasons,
including race. See John R. Bartels, Peremptory Challenge to Federal Judges: A Judge's View, 68
A.B.A. J. 449 (1982) (noting that dissenters to the 1981 proposals by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York to adopt the peremptory challenge in federal cases charged that the
challenge would allow judge shopping and provide an "arbitrary weapon that would remove a
judge from a particular case for any reason because of race, creed, color, or religion without
specification"); see also Burg, supra note 6, at 1476-77 (noting that the peremptory challenge
allows race and gender to be used as grounds for disqualification, and that the "inability to
detect" such challenges weighs against their adoption).
49. Without empirical data, predictions about what attorneys will do with peremptory chal-
lenges are guesswork, of course. The discussion here may nevertheless help to focus the general
debate upon more specific claims. A systematic survey of judges and attorneys such as the one
conducted in the mid-1980s by Larry Berkson and Sally Dorfmann, BERKSON & DORFMANN,
supra note 7, would be very useful.
50. See BERKSON & DoRFmANN, supra note 7, at 142 tbl.VII-9 (excluding responses from
California) (reporting also that one percent of the 311 prosecutors who responded said that
challenges are exercised on the basis of race); see also id. at 140-41 (summarizing figures from
table). About 10% of defense counsel and 4% of Chief Judges believed the judge's religion was
sometimes the reason for the challenge, although fewer respondents believed that gender played
a role. See id. at 142 tbl.VII-9. The authors characterized these findings by stating that "almost
none" of the respondents believed that peremptory challenges were exercised on the basis of
race, religion, or gender. Id. at 140. The authors also sent a letter of inquiry to 132 women
judges and 49 African-American judges in 15 states asking about whether challenges were exer-
cised on the basis of race or gender, but received responses from only six African-American
judges (all from two states) and 37 women judges. See id. at 147 (failing to note how researchers
categorized African-American women judges). "Only one black judge suggested that race might
be a factor," id. at 147 n.22, and four women judges "indicated that gender is regularly a motivat-
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
they suggest that the problem was isolated or infrequent. 51 There are
several reasons to anticipate that the problem may be of greater di-
mension today.
First, the 1985 study and other existing data on the abuse of the
judicial peremptory challenge was collected before the United States
Supreme Court had taken action to control the race-based exercise of
peremptory challenges of jurors in criminal cases, during a time when
litigants' reliance on race was, if not accepted, at least familiar. Re-
searchers and respondents to surveys about the judicial challenge may
not have been as aware that exercising any peremptory challenge on
the basis of race or sex is a serious and unconstitutional abuse of the
power delegated by statute. Some did recognize the newly developing
law in state courts restricting the race-based exercise of the jury per-
emptory challenge and raised this as an argument against judicial
challenges. 52
Second, and more important, the opportunities for such abuse
have increased. The regulation of race-based abuse of juror per-
emptories was delayed until significant numbers of African-American
ing force behind the exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 148. "Relatively few" prosecut-
ing attorneys favored challenges for cause over peremptory challenges. Id. at 262. One
prosecutor explained that when no claim of bias or prejudice is made, judges often suspect that
the real reason for invoking the challenge is illegitimate. See id.
51. Several other empirical studies of the judicial peremptory challenge conducted earlier
did not examine the possibility of race-based abuse. E.g., State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703, 722
(Wis. 1982) (reporting study by Office of the Director of State Courts of cases filed in first three
months of 1981); Judicial Disqualification: Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 52-57 (1973)
(describing study in California finding many judges reporting abuse of challenge for reasons
other than race of judge); BERKSON & DoRFmANN, supra note 7, at 86-89 (noting Idaho and
Montana studies, conducted in 1982 and 1979 respectively, examining the frequency of chal-
lenges and their impact on judicial calendar management problems); id. at 94-97 (noting a 1971
survey of nine chief justices in states using judicial peremptory challenges and a 1975 survey of
about 30 attorneys and several judges in California, both surveys finding general satisfaction
with the procedures); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947) (survey-
ing American practice); Kraig J. Marton, Note, Peremptory Challenges of Judges: The Arizona
Experience, 1973 L. & Soc. ORD. 95 (mentioning as improper purpose only efforts to delay
proceedings or to judge-shop, that is, select, rather than disqualify, a judge); Project, Disqualifi-
cation of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon
Experience, 48 OR. L. REV. 311, 347 (1969) (not examining race issues); see also ALAN J.
CHASET, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMP-
TORY CHALLENGE 34-40 (1981) (compiling information as of 1981, including survey of chief
judges in California who gave the challenge mixed reviews); Note, Change of Venue and Change
of Judge in a Civil Action in Indiana: Proposed Reforms, 38 IND. L.J. 289 (1962-63).
52. See New York City Bar Ass'n Comm., supra note 6, at 242-43 (reporting statements of
two members dissenting from the Committee's recommendation to allow peremptory challenges
of judges) (noting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), the precursors to Batson, and warning that the proposal "would allow a
litigant to strike a judge for any reason at all, because of the judge's race or religion, his views on
substantive legal issues, or because his caseload is current and the litigant wants delay").
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jurors were even permitted to reach the jury box and be subject to
challenge. 53 A similar pattern may develop for judges. Because the
bench has consisted almost entirely of white judges until the last sev-
eral years, only recently have litigants had the ability to shop for a
judge of a particular race or ethnicity. In particular, there were very
few, if any, judges of color on the bench in the predominantly western
and mid-western states that authorized judicial peremptory challenges
at the time when past studies were conducted. 54 According to one
source, in 1980, there were no African-American judges in half of the
states that allowed peremptory challenges, and only two of the re-
maining states (California and Illinois) had more than two African-
American trial judges.55 There are greater numbers of minority
judges on the trial bench today.
Some jurisdictions that permit peremptory challenges of the judi-
ciary now have a substantial number of judges of color presiding in
felony trial courts for the first time. Today, eight of the district judges
in Minneapolis and St. Paul are African-American. 56 The number of
minority judges in Oregon increased from one to six between 1986
and 1996.57 Eight African-American circuit judges sat in St. Louis and
Kansas City as of 1997.58 Milwaukee and Seattle, too, have added
53. See the historical discussion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986), and in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209-22 (1965).
54. See, e.g., Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, A Preliminary Report of the Exper-
iences of the Minority Judiciary in the City of New York, 18 How. L.J. 495, 530 app.I (1975)
(listing the number of African-American judges in 50 cities with the largest African-American
populations as of 1970) (showing no African-American judges in some cities that were about
40% African-American, such as Birmingham, Ala.; Richmond, Va.; Gary, Ind.; Jackson, Miss.;
and Savannah, Ga.; and only two African-American judges in several cities that were over 50%
African-American, such as Atlanta, Ga.; East St. Louis, Ill.; and Compton, Cal.); see also The
Black Judge in America: A Statistical Profile, 57 JUDICATURE 18, 18-19 & tbl.2 (June-July 1973)
(reporting 286 African-American judges sitting in early 1972 and that, of those responding to the
survey, over half of them sat in municipal courts and courts of limited jurisdiction).
55. See BERKSON & DoRFwANN, supra note 7, at 109 (listing African-American judges by
state, citing GEORGE W. CROCKEIT, JR. ET AL., NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK JUDICIAL OF-
FICERS, 1980 (1980)). By "trial judge" I mean to include only those judges in trial courts of
general jurisdiction, not municipal court judges.
56. See TASK FORCE ON MINORIES IN THE JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, DIREC-
TORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ABA DIREC-
TORY]; see also NATIONAL BAR AsS'N, ELECTED AND APPOINTED BLACK JUDGES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1991, at 46 (2d ed. 1991); Paul Gustafson, Study: Racism is Rife in State's Legal
System, STAR TRIa., June 11, 1993, at 1A (reporting that five percent of Minnesota's judges were
minority). Minnesota's African-American population has nearly tripled in less than two de-
cades, from 50,000 in 1980 to about 140,000 in 1997. See John Biewen & Derek McGinty, All
Things Considered: Blacks in Minneapolis (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 19, 1997).
57. See OREGON SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIALIETHNIC ISSUES IN THE JUDI-
CIAL SYS., PROGRESS REPORT OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT IMPLEMENTATION COMMIT-
TEE: A COMMITMENT TO FAIRNESS 88 (1996).
58. See ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 56, at 74.
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several trial judges of color.59 The diversification of the bench is evi-
dent in other jurisdictions as well. 60 In 1997, of the 645 authorized
lifetime judicial appointments to the United States District Courts,
sixty were held by African Americans, compared to only sixteen in
1976.61 Given this dramatic expansion in the opportunity to discrimi-
nate, past assurances of benign behavior would seem to carry little
predictive power.
Along with the increased opportunity to discriminate between
judges on the basis of race and ethnicity, the motive to do so remains.
Many trial attorneys and litigants continue to believe that the race or
ethnicity of the judge affects case outcome. Race-bias task force re-
ports, for example, repeatedly stress the need for more diversity on
59. Compare NATIONAL BAR Ass'N, supra note 56, at 74 (listing two African-American
Circuit Court judges in Milwaukee and four Superior Court judges in Seattle as of 1991), with
ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 56, at 114-17 (listing three African-American Circuit Court judges
in Milwaukee and nine Superior Court judges and commissioners in Seattle as of 1997).
60. Of 768 Superior Court judges in California in 1994, 81 (just over 10%) were African-
American, Latino, or Asian-American. See RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CALI-
FORNIA TRIAL COURTS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RA-
CIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS app.C (1994). Of the 149 trial judges in Tennessee in
1997, eight were African Americans, seven of whom served Memphis, which has the largest
percentage of African Americans of any city in the state. See TENNESSEE SuP. CT. COMM'N ON
RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT 74-75 (1997) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The
number of African-American Circuit Court judges in Mississippi increased from one to nine
from 1988 through 1997. See Marshal Ingwerson, In New Tactic, Blacks Use Voting Rights Law
to Gain Judgeships in the South, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 19, 1988, at 1 (noting one judge);
ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 56, at 69-70 (noting nine Mississippi Circuit Court judges as of
1997).
61. See ABRAHAM L. DAVIS, BLACKS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: NEUTRAL ARBITERS OR
JUDICIAL AcTIvISTs?, at vi (1989) (stating that there were only 16 African-American federal
judges prior to President Carter's 1976 election); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Nontradi-
tional Judges in Active Service, 80 JUDICATURE 270 (1997) (providing 1997 figures, revealing that
the number of Hispanic, Native American, and Asian-American judges remained about the
same between 1992 and 1997 and that the bench gained one more Hispanic judge, one more
Native American judge, but lost one Asian-American judge). But see A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the South African Chal-
lenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028, 1067 app.C (1993) (counting 18 African-American judges in 1976). See
also REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, cited in Report of the
Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and
Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 202 (1996) (reporting that, as of July 1994, of 573
federal district judges, 8% were African-American, 5% were Hispanic, and less than 1% were
Asian-American (all Asian-American men were in the Ninth Circuit)) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit
Task Force]; Higginbotham, supra, at 1054 (comparing the number of African Americans ap-
pointed to the Federal bench by Presidents Carter (29), Reagan (6), and Bush (10)). The in-
crease in women on the federal bench has also been notable, rising from 68 trial judges in 1992 to
112 in 1997. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra, at 270.
In many of the jurisdictions that presently permit peremptory challenges of judges, the fel-
ony trial bench remains entirely, or almost entirely, white. North and South Dakota and Mon-
tana still have no African-American judges, although North Dakota now has one Native
American district judge and Montana one Hispanic justice of the peace. See ABA DIRECTORY,
supra note 56, at v, 170, 239. Idaho has only one African-American and one Hispanic judge. See
id. at v.
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the bench,62 and include testimony from attorneys reflecting their be-
lief that the judge's racial background is important to their clients.63
Minority voters continue to bring lawsuits alleging vote dilution in ju-
dicial elections involving minority judicial candidates.64 Perhaps the
best evidence that litigants believe that the race of a judge matters can
be found in published cases detailing efforts by litigants to disqualify a
judge because of his or her race. Over twenty-five years ago, Judge
Leon Higginbotham eloquently explained in Commonwealth v. Local
Union 54265 why it is essential to reject arguments that a judge's race
62. See Edward A. Adams, State Commission Finds Racism in Courts: 70 Suggestions Pro-
posed to Eliminate 2-Tier System, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1991, at 1 (reporting recommendations of the
New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities to increase minority representation on the
bench); Verdict Reactions Show We Have a Long Way to Go, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 5,1995,
at 18A (reporting that the Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial and Ethnic Bias rec-
ommended getting more African Americans into judgeships and screening potential judges for
racial bias); FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 72-73.
63. See, e.g., ERICA DREWES, JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND
ETHICAL BIAS IN THE COURTS, 1991-92 PUBLIC HEARINGS ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT SYSTEM 106 (1993) (quoting attorney who noted that reassignment
to Latino judge was beneficial to client, stating the Latino judge "is much more sensitive, much
more conscious of the culture, of the language, the problems that are in North County in San
Diego"); Ingwerson, supra note 60, at 1, 9 (quoting attorney stating, "The system would be per-
ceived in the black community as fairer with black judges on the bench .... It would make
blacks feel easier.") (quoting another attorney saying, "Most of the black clients [in the county
with the state's lone African-American trial judge] ... like going before a black judge. They
think he'll be fair."); D.C. Circuit Task Force, supra note 61, at 226-27 & n.112 (noting that the
perception that D.C. Superior Court was fairer than federal court was due "in part to the
demographics of the court," and that African-American attorneys "feel they get a better recep-
tion as minority professionals in the local courts, where there are more minorities among the
staff, the bench, and the bar"). Judges, too, may believe race matters. In New York, researchers
concluded that
[t]here are significant differences between the perceptions of white and minority judges
regarding treatment of litigants. More than three quarters of the white judges reported
that the biased behaviors about which they were queried "rarely/never" happen. Mi-
nority judges perceived biased behavior happening with considerably greater fre-
quency; nearly three quarters felt that racial stereotypes play a role in the evaluation of
many cases.
5 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES: APPENDIX-STAFF
REPORTS AND WORKING PAPERS 28 (1991). Asked what role racial diversity should play in
judicial selection, 53% of white and 99% of minority judges responded that diversity was impor-
tant or very important, see id. at 45 tbl.13; 87% of minority judges, but only 70% of white judges
thought cross-cultural sensitivity training was very or somewhat important for judges, see id. at
54 tbl.15; 19% of minority judges but only 2% of white judges indicated that the race of a judge
greatly affects the treatment of judges by attorneys, see id. at 55 tbl.16; and 78% of white judges
but only 24% of minority judges said that race has no relationship to how judges are treated by
attorneys. See id.; cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 399 (1991) (noting the representative
character of elected judges).
64. See generally Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); Kirsten L. Izatt, Note, The
Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections: Accommodating the Interests of States Without Compro-
mising the Goals of the Act, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 229.
65. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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is a basis for disqualification. 66 Litigants, however, continued to raise
these claims. In LeRoy v. City of Houston,67 the City moved to dis-
qualify an African-American judge from adjudicating voting rights is-
sues on the theory that, as an African-American voter, the judge stood
to benefit from a decision favoring the plaintiffs. 68 Using a similar
rationale, state's attorneys challenged the judge in United States v. Al-
abama,69 alleging that his status as a parent of African-American chil-
dren who may be affected by the decision in the desegregation case at
issue created at least the appearance of bias.70 Although race was
rebuffed as a basis for disqualification in all of these cases,71 each was
litigated in federal court, where bias or the appearance of bias suffi-
cient for disqualification must be established with evidence by the
challenging party.72 A peremptory challenge would have provided a
barrier-free bypass for these and other litigants with such race-based
suspicions, suspicions that appear with some frequency in criminal
cases and seemed to have played a role in the California cases detailed
earlier.73 And with the small proportion of judges of color in most
jurisdictions, attorneys can expect that any minority judge who is chal-
lenged probably will be replaced by a white judge. The substitution of
a minority judge for a challenged white judge could be the object of a
66. See id. at 181. Judge Higginbotham wrote:
So long as Jewish judges preside over matters where Jewish and Gentile litigants disa-
gree; so long as Protestant judges preside over matter where Protestant and Catholic
litigants disagree; so long as white judges preside over matters where white and black
litigants disagree, I will preside over matters where black and white litigants disagree,
Id.
67. 592 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Tex.), affd, 745 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1984).
68. See id. at 416-18.
69. 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987).
70. See id. at 1538-39; see also Charles Malarkey, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orien-
tation Cause in California?, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 695 (noting "[mlotions have been made to
disqualify judges for [membership in a minority group]. Such a motion is damaging to the public
confidence in the judiciary and insulting to the judge involved.") (quoting SENATE Comm. ON
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, 1983-84 Regular Sess. 5 (Cal. 1984))
(alterations in original).
71. See United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d at 1542 ("To disqualify minority judges from
major civil rights litigation solely because of their minority status is intolerable.").
72. See id. at 1540.
73. In criminal cases, litigants may rely on stereotypes about racially based views concern-
ing police credibility or behavior or the credibility of particular witnesses or testimony. Women
judges, too, have been the target of disqualification motions due to their gender. See Nancy L.
Farrer, Of Ivory Columns and Glass Ceilings: The Impact of the Supreme Court of the United
States on the Practice of Women Attorneys in Law Firms, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 529, 551 n.126
(1997) (describing case in which defendant alleged that a woman judge could not judge impar-
tially because she would be opposed to defendant's view that women must obey men); see also
Malarkey, supra note 70, at 718 n.148 (reporting that "some of the attorneys who have filed
motions for peremptory disqualification" against a San Francisco judge said that she "'sides with
women and often comes out on the side of women plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits."') (quot-
ing S.F Judge Repeatedly Disqualified, S.F. BANNER DAILY J., Feb. 3, 1989, at 6).
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litigant's challenge, but, given the racial demographics of most trial
benches, this result would be more difficult to achieve.74
On the other hand, there are also reasons to conclude that attor-
neys will refrain from exercising judicial peremptory challenges on the
basis of race. First, race, at least in the jury context, often has been
used by litigants as a proxy for predicted belief and behavior, a guess
about qualities litigants cannot or do not discover prior to trial. Liti-
gants know more about individual judges than they do about jurors.
Judges have track records-prior decisions made while on the bench,
statements made in public forums, professional and political reputa-
tions years deep. With such a wealth of information about a judge's
beliefs, litigants may rely less readily on crude predictors like race or
gender.75
Another factor that makes the abuse of judicial challenges much
less likely than the abuse of the juror challenge is the comparative
homogeneity of judges. Litigants may realize that judges-whatever
their race-have much more in common with each other than do most
jurors. Judges of color appear to be less affluent than white judges
and more likely to come from public interest practice rather than pri-
vate law firms,76 but judges of all races have been to law school and
have forged the political ties needed to secure appointment or elec-
tion.77 Judges, unlike jurors, are confined by rules requiring them to
74. Professor Richard McAdams suggested to me that after Batson, the race of the judge
may matter even more in jury cases to litigants who suspect that the race of a judge may influ-
ence how sensitive that judge will be to race-based peremptory challenges of jurors. Email ex-
change with Richard McAdams, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law (Dec. 22,
1997).
75. Terry Cams, of the Alaska Judicial Council, who has studied the use of peremptory
challenges in Alaska, stated to me that it was her impression that the judicial peremptory chal-
lenge in Alaska was not exercised because of a judge's race or gender, but because of prior
rulings or perceived political leanings. Telephone interview with Teresa White Cams, Senior
Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council (July 17, 1997).
76. Cf. Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to
Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 259 tbl.2, 268 tbl.5 (1997) (comparing backgrounds of Clinton's first-
term nontraditional (minority and female) and traditional judicial appointees to the district and
circuit courts) (showing that nontraditional appointees are more likely to have a background in
public interest work and less likely to have a background in private law firm work than are
traditional appointees and, taking district and circuit court appointees together, nontraditional
appointees tend to have a lower net worth than traditional appointees); Sheldon Goldman, Judi-
cial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 280 (1995) (explain-
ing that Clinton's nontraditional judicial appointees are more likely to have come from public
interest backgrounds than from private firms); Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clin-
ton's Nontraditional Judges: Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68 (1994)
(postulating that Clinton's nontraditional appointees are from less financially secure back-
grounds because they attended less expensive law schools than did his traditional appointees).
77. Indeed, although it is not directly relevant for the purposes of predicting whether attor-
neys will use race to predict judicial behavior, what few studies there are that test this hypothesis
suggest that other variables have much stronger predictive power than race. See, e.g., Thomas G.
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justify their decisions in written opinions. In most states, judges stand
for reelection or at least reappointment. These constraints may con-
tribute to more uniform decisionmaking, regardless of personal char-
acteristics.78 In particular, a judge's discretion to set a sentence, which
in the past has been a major catalyst for the use of the peremptory
challenge in criminal cases, 79 has been drastically curtailed in many
jurisdictions by guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and other
presumptive sentencing schemes.80 This in turn, has made the identity
of the judge even less determinative of case outcome.
In addition, peremptory challenges of judges are less likely than
juror challenges to be exercised at all, whatever the reason. The cost
of exercising peremptory challenges against judges is much higher
than in the jury context. Some attorneys probably are reluctant to
challenge judges for any reason, much less race, because they may
Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process
Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 606-07 (1985) (comparing the rulings in criminal cases of 29 Afri-
can-American judges with those of 56 white judges of the same gender and concluding "the
differences were negligible," a finding consistent with "earlier studies of the sentencing process
in local courts which have found little or no difference in the application of criminal law based
upon the race or gender of the presiding judge"). In a 1988 study, researchers concluded that
"black judges may slightly favor defendants of their own race when determining the overall
harshness of a sentence, while white judges probably do not do so." Susan Welch et al., Do
Black Judges Make a Difference? 32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 126, 133-34 (1988). A recent study of the
decisions of 10 African-American judges and 10 white judges who were of the same gender,
appointed by the same President, and of the same judicial district concluded that "black judges
are significantly more supportive of issues relating to blacks and the black community than white
judges," but "[n]o meaningful racial difference was found with regard to criminal rights... and
personal liberties issues." Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional
Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279, 279 (1997).
78. Nor can judges as easily get away with nullifying the law, as jurors sometimes can. See
CHASET, supra note 51, at 59-62 (noting differences between jurors and judges); see also Stephen
B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the Work
of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1971, 1982-93 (1997) (describing judicial disobedience by
one prominent district court judge).
79. As a thoughtful committee concluded before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
enacted, "Ignorance of the sentencing judge's identity deters many prospective guilty pleas be-
cause of defense counsel perception that a few judges tend to sentence significantly above the
average." See Criminal Procedure Comm., Eastern Dist. of New York, supra note 6, at 307 n.1;
see also Hornaday v. Rowland, 674 P.2d 1333, 1333 & n.1 (Alaska 1983) (striking down order to
transfer judge who had been rendered relatively useless in the community where he was presid-
ing after he had been challenged in over 82% of his criminal cases by defense counsel following
his announcement that he would lock up drunk drivers for significantly longer terms than other
judges); Dwayne Bray, Ex Jurist Criticizes D.A. for Disqualifying Judge, L.A. TIMES, April 23,
1994, at B1 (noting district attorney had systematically disqualified judge from criminal cases
following judge's decision to reduce a charge and impose the lowest possible prison term). In-
deed, sentencing reform was proposed as an alternative to the judicial peremptory challenge as a
means to cope with unusually lenient or severe sentences. See NEW YORK Crrv BAR Ass'N
Comm ., supra note 6, at 242 (dissenting statement) ("Insofar as criminal cases are concerned,
although widely disparate sentencing practices are objectionable, this problem can better be ad-
dressed by proposals for sentencing panels, appellate review of sentencing, or similar reforms.").
80. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at § 26.3.
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anticipate that the judge, or her fellow judges, will hold that challenge
against the lawyer or his firm.81 Unlike jurors, who may never learn
which party challenged them (or even that they had been challenged,
should the challenges be successfully contested), a judge knows who
has tried to replace her.82 For a lawyer active in litigation, the likeli-
hood of again facing a challenged judge is high, while the probability
of encountering a challenged juror again is extremely small.83 Finally,
attorneys who want to avoid a particular judge may rely on means of
judge-shopping other than the peremptory challenge, including filing
several cases simultaneously and dismissing all but the case before
one's preferred judge.84
While these latter points may reassure supporters of the chal-
lenge that the race-based challenge will never become the problem
that it became in the jury setting, they do not eliminate the potential
for abuse. Indeed, "blanket challenges" by prosecutors and defense
attorneys in states with judicial peremptories occur with some fre-
quency, indicating that attorneys for many criminal litigants are not
deterred from using the challenge and continue to find it useful.
81. See CARNS, supra note 11, at 8-9 (reporting that the court administrator in Arizona
remarked that attorneys there used the challenge infrequently "because it would make them
unpopular with the judge"); Fi.AMM, supra note 7, at 64 nn.11-12; People v. Superior Court
(Williams), 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873, 888 (1992) ("It is an understatement to say that judges have
vastly more power over an attorney's pursuit of his livelihood than prospective jurors .... ").
82. There is ample evidence that such chilling occurs in other contexts. For example, attor-
neys, particularly in the criminal justice system where the same attorneys appear over and over
again before the same judge, have indicated that they are reluctant to object to improper and
offensive judicial behavior for fear of alienating the judge. See DREWES, supra note 63, at 213-
14.
83. As another commentator put it, "If you are going to shoot a judge, it does no good to
wound him." See Malarkey, supra note 70, at 695 (quoting Evan A. Davis & Alisa F. Levin,
Disqualifying Judges, 7 Lrimo. 11 (1981)).
84. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for Venue: The Need for More Limits, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 295-98 (1996) (describing random assignment systems and an incredible
array of recent efforts by litigants to circumvent them, including a case in which lawyers were
suspected of shopping for a Catholic judge); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMM., EASTERN DIST. OF
N.Y., supra note 6, at 306-07 (spelling out ways in which prosecutors could try to manipulate
existing judicial selection system to procure favorable judge, including efforts to file superseding
indictment or other charges against the same defendant in hopes of getting better judge, and
designating a case as related to one already before a favorable judge); Standing Comm. on Disci-
pline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1392-93 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (describing repeated judge shop-
ping by one attorney); cf Claire Cooper, New Prop. 209 Judge Urged, SACRAMENTO BEE,
January 18, 1997, at A5 (noting controversy over judge who took over case from another judge
because of a rule about the assignment of related cases, including allegations that plaintiffs
"commandeered" the suit).
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II. ADDRESSING THE RACE-BASED ABUSE OF JUDICIAL
PEREMPTORIES
Controlling the race-based abuse of judicial peremptory chal-
lenges would be difficult. One option available to those interested in
preserving the peremptory challenge in the jury context while mini-
mizing its abuse is to reduce the number of peremptories available to
litigants, making the challenge a much less effective tool for manipu-
lating jury demographics. Reducing the number of challenges, how-
ever, is not feasible for judicial challenges, which are typically
available on a one-challenge-per-case basis. If not eliminated entirely,
judicial challenges must be policed, as are juror challenges, in order to
prevent violations of the Equal Protection Clause.85 Yet the rules reg-
ulating jury challenges do not translate easily to judicial challenges.
Applying Batson to the bench raises several difficult questions.
First, there is the problem of adequate proof of a constitutional
violation. A claimant alleging that a judicial challenge violates equal
protection must prove the challenger's intentional use of race. Liti-
gants rarely admit that they are shopping for a judge of a particular
race or ethnicity. As a result, the pivotal issue for allegations of racial
discrimination here, as in other phases of the criminal justice system,
is the showing that the person who claims discrimination took place
must make in order to require a response from the alleged discrimina-
tor.86 At one extreme, a court could require direct proof of discrimi-
natory intent or, short of that, a detailed statistical showing that the
particular litigant who has been accused of challenging a judge be-
cause of her race has done so repeatedly in the past, something like
the showing the Court has required under McClesky or Swain.87 Be-
cause the judicial challenge occurs only once per case, however, pat-
terns are nearly impossible to come by. Thus a Swain-like standard,
even for repeat-player litigants such as prosecutors' and defenders'
offices, would be about as effective as no standard at all. Moreover,
unlike the problem of selective prosecution, there is no countervailing
concern about executive discretion or the separation of powers raised
by judicial challenges that might warrant a convincing showing of in-
85. Conceivably, a state might decide to try to minimize abuse of the challenge by limiting
the number of challenges any one litigant could exercise, rather than limiting the number of
challenges per case. The most obvious method would be to allocate one challenge per predeter-
mined number of cases. But the disparate effects of such a rule, not to mention the regulatory
efforts needed to enforce it, would probably be prohibitive.
86. See, e.g., Richard McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 Cm.-KET L. REv. 605 (1998).
87. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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tent before requiring a race-neutral explanation.88 At the other ex-
treme, a court could require a litigant to advance a plausible race-
neutral reason for the challenge in every case in which the challenge is
employed. (Given the color-blind nature of present-day equal protec-
tion doctrine, it would not do to single out judges of one race for more
or less protection under the Constitution by, for example, allowing
challenges to white judges to slide through without justification, but
demanding explanations for challenges to judges of color.89) Yet, re-
quiring a reason for the challenge in every case would deprive the
peremptory challenge of its utility, "curing the disease but killing the
patient," as Professor William Pizzi has stated. 9°
What may be most promising for those who wish to maintain the
uneasy compromise between the peremptory challenge and the Equal
Protection Clause 9' is a middle ground, where race-neutral reasons
are required in some cases, but not others. Batson attempts to do this
in the jury context by requiring a prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion before a litigant's challenge must be explained.92 A prima facie
case of racial motivation for a judicial challenge is more difficult to
establish. Many of the factors used in the jury context to identify po-
tential discrimination (e.g., a pattern of strikes against jurors of one
race or selective questioning of potential jurors of one race or ethnic-
ity) are not particularly useful in the judicial challenge context.93
88. Cf United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). See generally Robert Heller, Com-
ment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful
Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997) (describing justifica-
tions for court's reluctance to intrude on charging discretion, including concerns that intrusion
would undermine prosecutorial effectiveness and interfere with the appropriate balance of
power between the judiciary and the executive).
89. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995); cf. J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that "if background'or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others").
90. 'iliam T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987
Sup. CT. REV. 97, 97. Some judges demand race-neutral explanations for juror strikes without
requiring a prima facie case of discrimination. See Tracy M.Y. Choy, Note, Branding Neutral
Explanations Pretextual Under Batson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the Trial
Judge in Jury Selection, 48 HASTiNGS L.J. 577, 585 (1997).
91. There are those, of course, who have argued that any peremptory challenge is inher-
ently arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 153 (1989).
92. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
93. Consider one list of the types of evidence that may raise the inference of discrimination:
(1) statistics showing that race is the only common characteristic among the excluded jurors; (2)
a "pattern of strikes against black jurors on the particular venire"; (3) "past conduct of the
state's attorney"; (4) "type and manner of the state's attorney's questions and statements"; (5)
"type and manner of questions directed to the challenged juror, including a lack of questions, or
a lack of meaningful questions"; (6) "[d]isparate treatment of members of the jury venire with
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Without the voir dire process and multiple challenges, a litigant's
likely intent must be assessed using the past record of the litigant's use
of judicial challenges in other cases and the features of the individual
case such as racial identity between the opposing litigant and the ex-
cluded judge94 or the presence of racially sensitive issues,95 factors
that might lead a reasonable person to suspect that race motivated the
challenge.96
An analogous system is already in place in Illinois, where the
State Supreme Court adopted a Batson-like procedure to curtail liti-
gants' efforts to use the judicial peremptory challenge to delay pro-
ceedings or to thwart the chief judge's independence in assigning cases
to the judges in his circuit.97 If a litigant opposing his adversary's chal-
lenge demonstrates a prima facie case of improper purpose, the chal-
lenger must demonstrate that "there are facts or circumstances related
to the particular case at hand which indicate that the judge is
prejudiced." 98 A similar device is used in Oregon to curb challenges
of particular judges in order to delay proceedings. A basis for a belief
that the judge may not be a neutral impartial arbiter need not be
stated initially, but if an explanation is demanded by the challenged
judge, a hearing must be held at which the judge has the burden of
proving the challenge was made in "bad faith." 99 An obvious cost of
the same characteristics, or who answer a question in the same or similar manner"; (7)
"[d]isparate examination of members of the venire"; (8) disparate impact statistics that demon-
strate that most of the challenges were used to strike African Americans from the jury; and (9)
the state's use of peremptory challenges to remove all or most African-American jurors in the
case. Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622-23 (Ala. 1987); see also Choy, supra note 90, at 585-86
(summarizing the Branch factors).
94. Cf Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (describing greater ease of making prima
facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenge of juror where defendant and juror are of the
same race).
95. See Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects
of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 86-90 (1993) (listing case attributes judges
consider when gauging the presence of discriminatory motive or the effects of racially charged
argument, including the presence of African-American attorneys or witnesses).
96. Every judge has a race, one might argue, so that every peremptory challenge is conceiv-
ably race-based-the challenge of the white judge is just as suspect as the challenge of a minority
judge. The same argument has not prevented judges from continuing to distinguish between
circumstances that suggest jury discrimination and circumstances that do not, however.
97. See People ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton, 556 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill. 1990); see also People
v. Ross, 614 N.E.2d 182, 189 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (interpreting Wharton to mean that when a
defendant objects to a prosecutor's challenge, defendant has the burden of alleging facts which,
if true, would require a hearing and finding no such basis for ordering a hearing in the instant
case).
98. Wharton, 556 N.E.2d at 260.
99. State ex rel. Kafoury v. Jones, 843 P.2d 932, 938 (Or. 1992) ("[I]n rare cases, 'bad faith'
may be proved where the movant's sincere belief is so irrational that allowing the motion would
amount to 'an outright hindrance' of the court's ability to adjudicate the case.").
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such a system, however, is the added burden for the trial judge who is
forced to intervene in someone else's case.
Assuming that a court is able to distinguish which peremptory
challenges require explanation and which do not, there is the addi-
tional task of defining the type of explanations that would be suffi-
cient. The Supreme Court's decision in Purkett v. Elam'00 suggests
that any old race-neutral reason, even an irrational or subjective rea-
son or a reason that would have applied equally to support the chal-
lenge of any judge, will provide adequate support for a finding of no
intentional discrimination. However, these standards, taken from the
jury context, may be inappropriate for judicial challenges. Presently,
courts require better explanations for suspicious juror challenges in
military trials, where a litigant is afforded only one peremptory chal-
lenge per case and where decisionmakers on the jury consist of those
who are equal or senior to the accused in rank or grade and who are
"best qualified for duty by reason of age, education, training, experi-
ence, length of service, and judicial temperament.' 01 Conceivably,
the same reasons that support requiring a "reasonable" race-neutral
basis for disqualifying a juror of the accused's race in that context also
support requiring better reasons for suspicious judicial peremptories
as well. Alternatively, some of the guidelines that state courts have
adopted for assessing whether to credit a litigant's claimed reason for
challenging a juror should also be applied to judicial substitution.
These guidelines include: (1) whether the reason for the challenge
relates to the particular case, (2) whether, in similar cases, the litigant
has exercised challenges against persons of other races who met the
same criteria, and (3) whether the reason for challenge is based on
objective evidence or merely on subjective judgment. 102
It is not uncommon for a judge to become the subject of a refusal
or disqualification motion due to his or her pre-bench political activi-
ties,103 so it is likely that such activities will be advanced as race-neu-
100. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1994); see also United States v. Tulloch, 47 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F.
1997) (requiring reasonable race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge of a minority
juror, finding standard set out in Purkett inapplicable to military tribunal).
102. See Choy, supra note 90, at 590 (listing factors used by courts in New York to determine
whether Batson explanations are pretextual).
103. One well-known example of an effort to disqualify a minority judge due to her prior
political activity is the ruling in Bin Wahad v. Coughlin, 853 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
There, state prison officials filed a motion requesting the refusal of Judge Constance Baker Mot-
ley in a case based on allegations of bias due to the judge's prior civil rights activism and rela-
tionship as a cousin to member of the Black Panther Party allegedly killed by the FBI. See id. at
684. Another interesting case is Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981). That case
involved the ratification of the ERA, and the judge denied a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455, in
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tral reasons for peremptory challenges. Litigation concerning the
propriety of excluding potential jurors through peremptory challenges
because of their political or speech activity is only in its infancy. 1°4 As
Professor Andrew Leipold has recently suggested, classifying poten-
tial jurors in this way cannot be necessary to address the compelling
concern that the state has in assuring the impartiality of jurors, be-
cause "by the time the parties exercise peremptories, the trial judge
has necessarily decided that the existing jury panel can be impar-
tial .... "105 Nor would it appear that political activity could serve as
a legitimate basis for removing a judge. The peremptory challenge of
judges is invariably a supplement to existing provisions that permit a
judge to be challenged with proof of bias (and often with merely proof
from which a reasonable person would question impartiality). 106
There is no compelling interest that would permit a state to allow at-
torneys to pick and choose among judges according to whether or not
they have engaged in activities protected under the First Amendment.
Indeed, this issue has already been raised in California. Assigned to
hear a case involving county regulation of gay bathhouses, Judge Jack
Newman was challenged by the county defendants after a Republican
county supervisor criticized Newman for his ties to the Democratic
party.10 7 The bathhouse owners and the ACLU argued that a per-
emptory challenge of judge or juror based on party affiliation and
political activity is unconstitutional, but their argument was
rejected. 108
In addition to setting the standards for proving intentional dis-
crimination, courts will have to resolve who has standing to object to
an allegedly race-based peremptory challenge. Must a judge litigate
her own removal, or may litigants protest that removal on her behalf?
Locating the holder of the right that is violated when a judge is chal-
lenged because of her race is simple enough: the constitutional right
which one party had questioned his impartiality based on his affiliation with a church that op-
posed the ERA. See id. at 733.
104. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Chal-
lenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567
(1996).
105. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming Feb. 1998).
106. In federal court, and in jurisdictions that have adopted similar standards for "cause"
challenges of judges, the judge is subject to removal not only when the judge is biased, but also
when his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994); see also
United States v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying statute).
107.. See Kim Murphy, Politics Cited as Judge is Taken off Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1986, pt.
2, p. 6 .
108. See id.
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to be free from government classifications based on race belongs to
the judge, just as jurors possess the equal protection rights champi-
oned by the Court in its peremptory challenge cases. 109 What is
harder is identifying who may obtain relief when that right is denied,
other than the judge herself.
The Court has been willing to extend standing in equal protection
cases farther than in other types of cases and has been particularly
free in affording standing in jury discrimination and voting cases. 110 A
similar approach makes sense here. A litigant may be able to raise an
objection to a judicial challenge using a third-party standing argument
like that endorsed by the Court in Powers v. Ohio"' and Campbell v.
Louisiana.112 In Powers and Campbell, the Court applied its three-
part test for third party standing" 3 to hold that a white defendant may
challenge his conviction based on the alleged exclusion of African-
Americans from juries because of their race." 4 The requirement that
the potential jurors' ability to protect their own rights be hindered was
most easily met, as jurors were unlikely to pursue on their own behalf
available remedies against race-based jury selection.115 The requisite
109. The Batson right, however, began as a right of the criminal defendant alone and was
only later shifted to the juror, as primarily a right to be free from race-based exclusion. See
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); see also Echlin v.
LeCureux, 995 F.2d 1344, 1351 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that Powers established a "new rule"
barred from habeas review by Teague v. Lane, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Holland v. McGinnis, 963
F.2d 1044, 1053 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the holding of Powers allowing cross-racial chal-
lenges to peremptory strikes is a "new rule"); King, supra note 95, at 67 (discussing Batson). See
generally Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is
It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
110. See David Flickinger, Standing in Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 381
(1997); Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995); Pamela S.
Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
287, 290-95 (1996) (discussing standing for equal protection claims in voting cases); Brian R.
Markley, Comment, Constitutional Provisions in Conflict: Article III Standing and Equal Protec-
tion after Shaw v. Reno, 43 KAN. L. REV. 449 (1995).
111. 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991) (allowing white criminal defendant to challenge his convic-
tion based on the race-based exclusion of African-American venirepersons during voir dire).
112. 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998) (concluding that white defendant had standing to challenge race-
based selction of grand jurors).
113. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 114-16 (1976) (setting forth elements for as-
serting third-party standing: injury in fact to litigant, close relation between party asserting right
and right holder, and inability of right holder to assert own right).
114. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11; Campbell, 118 S. Ct at 1423.
115. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (noting that it is a rare occasion when excluded juror brings
suit on own behalf); see also Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424 ("[G]rand jurors have the same eco-
nomic disincentives to assert their own rights as do excluded petit jurors."); Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 262 n.5 (1986) (noting that excluded jurors rarely bring discrimination cases "un-
doubtedly" because they lack knowledge about discriminatory practices and because of lack of
incentive to initiate legal battle); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979) (finding that actions
by jurors challenging exclusion based on race are infrequent because they are lengthy and
expensive).
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"close relationship" between the defendant and the wronged juror
was established by the joint interest in eliminating racial discrimina-
tion from the courtroom and the prospect of the reversal of conviction
should discrimination be proven, making the defendant "a motivated,
effective advocate for the excluded" potential juror. 16 Finally, the
Court found that the defendant suffered an "injury in fact" because
racial discrimination in the selction of jurors "casts doubt over the
obligations of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to
the law . . "117
There are significant differences between judicial challenges and
jury challenges, differences that some might argue would provide a
basis for denying standing to litigants seeking to block the abuse of
one but not the other. First of all, regardless of how likely it is that
jurors may object to being bumped from a case, even for improper
reasons, judges are apt to be less complacent. Judges lack the incen-
tives to avoid service that may fuel juror passivity, and they possess
the knowledge and power needed to protest such a challenge." 8
Moreover, any actual injury suffered by the litigant when a judge
is challenged is arguably less serious than either the injury to the liti-
gant who witnesses the race-based peremptory challenges during his
trial, as in Powers, or the injury to the litigant whose trial judge has
discriminated against grand jurors on the basis of race, as in Campbell.
116. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14 (stating that a common interest exists because both the de-
fendant and the excluded juror want to eliminate race discrimination); see also Campbell, 118 S.
Ct. at 1424 ("we find no reason why a white defendant would be any less effective as an advo-
cate for excluded grand jurors than for excluded petit jurors.").
117. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. The Court explained:
The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State
and its prosecutors. The intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection pro-
cess damages both the fact and the perception of this guarantee. "Jury selection is the
primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury
free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or predisposition about the defendant's
culpability." ...
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the
community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance
with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not be accepted or understood in
these terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset. Upon these consider-
ations, we find that a criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the prosecutor ex-
cludes jurors at his or her own trial on account of race.
Id. at 411-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989)); see
also Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423 (noting that if the process of grand jury selection "is infected
with racial discrimination, doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions").
118. Consider the case of Judge Dorn, the African-American judge who protested the prose-
cutor's peremptory challenge in the case of Damian Williams. See supra notes 19-32 and accom-
panying text; cf Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Powers
and holding that prison guards face no impediment to asserting their own First Amendment
rights).
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Unlike jury challenges that take place in open court, judicial chal-
lenges occur on paper. 119 A judge is assigned. A motion is filed. An
order is entered. The judge need not physically rise and step down
from the bench to make way for another, as in the jury context. Ar-
guably, less "doubt" is cast upon "the fairness of [the] criminal pro-
ceeding"'120 when the discrimination is neither taking place in open
court for all to hear and witness first hand nor instigated by the judge
himself.' 21
Yet the effect of the discrimination on the expectations or trust of
trial participants cannot determine who may protest and who may not.
Such a measure would entail the tedious task of gauging the extent
and timing of disclosure of wrongdoing to the objecting litigant, fea-
tures affected only partially by the context in which the discrimination
took place, features that would vary from case to case. It would also
lead to the absurd result that those most skilled at concealing discrimi-
nation would be rewarded with greater immunity for their wrongs.
This problem was illustrated recently in a Sixth Circuit decision in
which a Hispanic defendant challenged his conviction based on the
denial of equal protection to "White and Other" non-African Ameri-
cans excluded from the qualified wheel of potential jurors.122 Pretrial
jury discrimination, the court reasoned, also "'damages both the fact
and the perception of' the defendants guarantee of a fair trial. ' 123
In another case examining the same jury selection plan,124 Dis-
trict Judge Gerald E. Rosen had made it clear that the presence of an
actual injury for standing purposes would not turn on the number and
proximity of witnesses to the discrimination. He declared expansively
that "active discrimination at any stage of the jury selection process
against any identifiable group-whether the identifiable group is a ra-
cial minority or a racial majority-by the very institution entrusted
with insuring jury service rights under the United States Constitution
causes injury to any litigant."'1 25 The judge also included a thoughtful
footnote, interesting especially for our purposes:
119. Hence the term "papering a judge" used to describe the process of challenging a judge
in California.
120. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
121. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424 (noting that discrimination in the selction of the grand
jury calls into question "the impartiality and discretion of the judge himself").
122. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998).
123. Id. at 1102 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
124. See United States v. Greene, 971 F. Supp 1117, 1120 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (opinion and
order denying defendant's motion for new trial).
125. Id. at 1134-35.
19981
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
[I]magine if there were a system which, at the outset, assigned
judges to cases based upon the race of the judge. For purposes of
determining whether a defendant had a close enough relationship to
the selection system by which he was assigned his judge, and to the
entire Bench, one need only ask if there would be any question that
the defendant would be deemed to have a close enough relationship
with the entire court such that he could challenge the racially dis-
criminatory assignment system-even if the judge to whom he was
assigned was not of the same race as he and even if he had never
been before or even met the non-assigned judges. Clearly, it would
not seriously be contended that the Defendant did not have a suffi-
ciently close relationship to the court as a whole to challenge the
assignment system.
The paradigm here is precisely the same. The Defendant's re-
lationship here is really that between the Defendant as an accused
and the excluded person as his prospective judge. This Court be-
lieves that the fact that the exclusion takes place more surrepti-
tiously at an earlier point in the process is largely irrelevant for
standing purposes.126
Pending further word from the Supreme Court, this unsettled law
suggests that parties should expect to litigate the complex issue of
standing when raising an objection to discriminatory judicial peremp-
tory challenges.
III. CONCLUSION
The choice of whether to adopt or preserve judicial peremptories
should not turn on the resolution of one issue. The risk that such chal-
lenges will be used to discriminate between judges on the basis of race
must be considered along with the other disadvantages of the chal-
lenge and weighed against its potential benefits. Nevertheless, if there
is one lesson to be learned from the last few decades of scrutiny of the
criminal justice system, it is that discretion can and will be used to
discriminate. This difficulty weighs heavily against injecting into our
justice system additional discretionary opportunities for litigants to
play the race card, absent a truly compelling reason to do so.
126. Id. at 1136 n.21.
[Vol. 73:509
